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Physical Emergence and Process Ontology

William M. Kallfelz

Committee for Philosophy and the Sciences (CPaS), Department of Philosophy,

University of Maryland, College Park, MD.

Submitted to:

World Futures Journal, special issue on process thought and natural science

Special editors: Franz Riffert and Timothy Eastman

June 3, 2007

Abstract

Alfred North Whitehead introduces in Process and Reality the notion that the “philosophy of organism is a cell-theory of actuality.” I argue here that the most promising venue for a concordance with process ontology vis-à-vis extant physical theory includes the notions of dynamical and ontological emergence in the physical sciences, as described for in Silberstein & McGeever (1999) as well as in Kronz & Tiehen (2002). Here I draw on my previous claims (1997, 2005, 2006) to show in more general terms how process ontology provides a more unified characterization of ontological and dynamical emergence. Read the rest of this entry »

UPDATED AND CORRECTED - 8/30/08

In his latest post, Henry writes:

“Mike’s position has been that W’s full scheme does entail an absolute serial order. My position is that W’s words do not entail such an absolute serial order of the coming into being of the occasions (or of their initiation and termination “dates”), and implicitly that Nobo’s supersessional ordering involves adding essential content to what W said (at least in PR). Whitehead’s words permit, I believe, a “relativistic” notion of coming into beingness in which the ordering of the parts of occasions whose standpoints are wholly spacelike is not ontologically or metaphysically or logically significant.”

I believe this to be an accurate summary of our respective views.  More accurately, my position is that Whitehead’s metaphysics and cosmology do imply a fundamental serial ordering of concrescences, as described above–but not one that is spatiotemporal.  The serial ordering is strictly mereological-logical and described fully in Whitehead’s Theory of Extension (Part IV of Process and Reality). Read the rest of this entry »

The issue here is whether Whitehead’s theory of nature, particularly as described in Process and Reality (PR), entails the existence of a universal/absolute/objective linear ordering in which all occasions (or at least their initiation and termination “dates”) can be placed. Nobo’s theory contains such an ordering (supersessional time), and one question is whether the existence of such an ordering is entailed by Whitehead’s actual words.

This issue has been the subject of a discussion involving Mike Epperson, Jorge Nobo, and myself. These exchanges have served to define the issues, and our respective understanding of W’s scheme. Mike’s position has been that W’s full scheme does entail an absolute serial order. My position is that W’s words do not entail such an absolute serial order of the coming into being of the occasions (or of their initiation and termination “dates”), and implicity that Nobo’s supersessional ordering involves adding essential content to what W said (at least in PR). Whitehead’s words permit, I believe, a “relativistic” notion of coming into beingness in which the ordering of the parts of occasions whose standpoints are wholly spacelike is not ontologically or metaphysically or logically significant. Read the rest of this entry »